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Affordable patient access to medicines, particularly to new
premium-priced medicines, is an issue, even in high-in-
come countries. The pharmaceutical industry has argued in
favour of price discrimination amongst countries based on
confidential discounts as a solution to ensuring afford-
ability and availability in less-resourced countries. In this
editorial, we explain why we disagree, and we elaborate on
why price transparency can contribute to affordable patient
access to medicines.
1 Current Situation
Non-availability, non-affordability and delayed market
launch of medicines are issues that are not limited to low-
and middle-income countries. Public payers and pro-
grammes in Australia, Canada, Member States of the EU,
the USA and New Zealand have increasingly been strug-
gling with ensuring affordable access to medicines for their
patients. Despite their willingness to pay, small high-in-
come countries were not offered some of the new
medicines [1]. In countries with lower medicine price
levels (such as Greece, Spain or Portugal), medicines were
sometimes brought to the market months or years after
their first launch, typically in Germany [2]. Medicine prices
vary significantly globally, and the differences do not
necessarily reflect the economic situation of the purchasing
country [3]. The additional therapeutic benefit of some new
medicines is not as high as expected or desired and may not
justify premium prices [4, 5].
In almost all European high-income countries, the prices
of new medicines in other European countries are consid-
ered, to some extent, in pharmaceutical price setting in the
index country. This so-called external price referencing
(EPR) policy is, particularly in the case of new, high-cost
medicines, frequently supported by evidence generation
and assessment (e.g. through health technology assess-
ments) and individual negotiations and agreements on
products between payers and the pharmaceutical industry
[6]. While these managed-entry agreements can take dif-
ferent forms, such as price-volume agreements, risk-shar-
ing agreements, conditional reimbursement or coverage
with evidence development, they have all in common that
their contents are usually confidential [7].
2 Arguments Against and in Favour of Price
Transparency
There is agreement amongst stakeholders about the con-
tribution of EPR to possible availability issues: in settings
of widespread use of EPR (such as the case in Europe), this
policy incentivizes marketing authorisation holders to first
launch a product in countries with higher medicine price
levels and to delay market entry, or not market at all, in
lower-priced countries [8, 9]. This is done to avoid a
lowering of the average price level. It is also acknowledged
by some parties that pricing based solely on EPR is not fair
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The pharmaceutical industry’s argument, though, that
price discrimination through confidential discounts
(sometimes wrongfully labelled as ‘differential pricing’)
would be a key solution to ensure affordable access for
lower-resourced countries included in the cross-referencing
landscape is not unanimously shared. The argument is as
follows: Given the widespread use of EPR, the pharma-
ceutical industry cannot offer medicines at lower list prices
to poorer countries, since this would negatively impact
prices in more affluent countries that reference to these
countries. However, confidential discounts can allow the
industry to provide medicines to poorer countries (in which
they might not otherwise be available) without reducing the
list price against which other countries will reference [10].
We do not accept this argument. The combination of EPR
and confidential discounts is common practice in many
countries (well-resourced as well as less-resourced), but
affordable access has not yet improved for less-resourced
countries (as observed in Central and Eastern Europe) [11].
We do not understand why the actual prices paid need to
remain confidential. We acknowledge that publicly acces-
sible discounts could encourage policy makers to reference
to discounted prices to achieve lower prices in their own
countries, and this would reduce profits for the pharmaceu-
tical industry. However, even without disclosure of dis-
counts, payers could have lower prices if they changed the
methodology of their EPR policy and decided to reference to
published list prices reduced by a certain percentage (i.e.
making an assumption of a discount). Reasoning based on
solely financial implications under EPR may not adequately
reflect the full picture.
We argue for transparency inmedicine price deals. This is
guided by our understanding that partners in a negotiation
should meet on equal terms. Policy makers and purchasers
frequently report they feel pressurised into accepting con-
ditions and prices they consider unfavourable (or where they
are uncertain about how favourable the deal or offer is)
because they want to achieve access to new medicines for
their patients (Focus group discussion with policy makers
members of the Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement
Information/PPRI network, 20 November 2014).
Current pharmaceutical price negotiations are an
example of information asymmetry—a situation where one
party to the transaction has more complete and better
information than the other party. Multinational companies
acting globally meet purchasers that act nationally, or
regionally, or as single entities (e.g. hospitals that procure
individually). The current organisation of the healthcare
system in many countries (different funding responsibilities
between outpatient and inpatient sectors, and between
federal, regional and local levels) is characterized by
fragmentation, and this has weakened the purchasing
power of the procurers. During the Pharmaceutical Pricing
and Reimbursement Information (PPRI) conference 2015,
a high-level pharmaceutical industry representative criti-
cized public procurers: ‘‘Despite being monopsonists, you
are not good purchasers.’’ [12].
3 Options for the Future
One practical approach for procurers to, at least partially,
overcome the lack of transparency and information asym-
metry, and thus enhance purchasing power, would be
increased collaboration amongst procurers. This could also
benefit suppliers in terms of reduced transaction costs since
they would not need to separately negotiate with each
purchaser. However, if pharmaceutical companies attribute
higher value to the information asymmetry that strengthens
their negotiating position than to lower transaction costs,
they would likely oppose collaboration of competent
authorities (such as the recently launched Beneluxa col-
laboration of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and
Austria, or the Nordic Forum in Europe [13]). Whether
pharmaceutical industry opposition to such collaboration
should prevent it from happening is an open question.
Interestingly, some reluctance towards collaboration and
sharing of information has also been expressed by pro-
curers, each of whom is convinced (or has been persuaded
to believe) that they have made ‘the best deal’, suppliers
telling them that they have achieved the most favourable
conditions and pricing in return for not disclosing them.
Given the prevailing confidentiality, it is difficult to prove
the contrary! Few studies have reported on actual dis-
counted prices. Research on discounts for hospitals in five
European countries showed that Norway, a country with
joint procurement for public hospitals and disclosed dis-
counts, was able to achieve the best conditions, whereas
hospitals in the other countries were granted no, or smaller,
discounts that did not differ between hospitals [14, 15]. A
recent study on list prices and discounted prices for
oncology medicines in 15 European countries showed that
hospitals in Central and Eastern European countries were
granted smaller, or no, discounts compared with the dis-
counts in Italy and Spain for the same medicines [16].
Today, policy makers are, in general, aware that the
acceptance of confidential discounts can negatively impact
procurement and price negotiation in other health systems.
However, since they are responsible primarily for their own
budgets and expenditure, they must prioritize and will hence
accept discounts and rebates that are only granted on a
confidential basis, because they consider them beneficial
from their local healthcare perspective [17]. It would be
naı¨ve to expect policy makers and payers to disclose confi-
dential price deals, thus violating contractual obligations and
possiblymaking future similar deals less likely. Theymay be
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in a form of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ created by the confi-
dential price negotiations, in which the cooperation that
could ultimately benefit all payers in the long term may well
bring short-term disadvantage to individual payers [2, 17]. It
would be equally naı¨ve to expect the pharmaceutical industry
to push for price transparency and thus weaken their nego-
tiating position and power. Pharmaceutical companies con-
tribute to medical advances by producing needed medicines,
but, in business terms, their shareholders expect them to
maximize profits and would view any weakening of their
commercial position adversely.
There is an urgent need for affordable patient access to
essential medicines the world over. Price discrimination
through confidential discounts from industry has not con-
tributed to better affordability and availability, andmay have
quite contrary effects. Economic theory, and evidence from a
few real-life cases, suggests that price transparency supports
better-informed decisions and thus improves the negotiating
position of purchasers. We encourage policy makers to
implement collaborative action leading to a disclosure of
actual prices paid. While this may cause some short-term
‘pain’ in terms of reduced industry willingness to offer dis-
counted prices, we believe that the longer term ‘gain’ from
reducing the information asymmetry and producing a more
level playing field for negotiation between payers and
industry would justify any short-term downside. Possible
options could include legislative measures (to force disclo-
sure of actual prices), informal agreements amongst several
purchasers to share prices of selected premium-priced
medicines and even possible formal joint procurement. We
would, in the interim, like to see more empirical examples to
support our assumption that greater price transparency is
able to contribute to more affordable patient access.
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